The Return of Violence: Motivations and Repercussions of the Istanbul Attack
Karam Said
Researcher specializing in regional affairs - Al-Ahram
In a precedent that is the first of its kind in about five years, on November 13, the Taksim region in Istanbul witnessed a violent attack that killed 6 citizens and injured about 84 others. Turkey accused the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it classifies as terrorist, of masterminding the attack, and arrested a Syrian named Ahlam al-Bashir – she admitted During the investigation, she belonged to the Kurdish "People's Protection Units" in northern Syria, and the Turkish security added in a statement that the attacker confessed to receiving training from Kurdish militants in Ayn al-Arab "Kobani". Despite the PKK's denial of responsibility for the incident, Ankara did not pay attention to Al-Kurdistan's denial, and admitted that the PKK seeks to clear his name in the framework of his attempt to avoid negative repercussions on him internally in Turkey, as well as in terms of Turkish reactions against him in both Syria and Iraq.
The terrorist attack in Istanbul undercuts the hypothesis that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) sought to export as the "safe Turkish model", as Turkey was seen during the past five years as a stable country that succeeded in besieging terrorism despite its presence at the epicenter of a wide number of regional conflicts.
Triggering contexts:
The terrorist attack carried out by the Syrian Ahlam al-Bashir, who is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party, is linked to a context that stimulates hatred between Turkey and the Kurdish currents in the region. It has been dedicated to it in recent years. An anti-Kurdish discourse arose in Turkey, and it reached its climax with the rise of the political weight of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In addition to the successes achieved by the Peoples' Democratic Party inside Turkey, its entry into parliament, and its victory in a large number of local municipalities in 2019, which prompted Turkey to adopt measures against Kurdish ambitions.
The Turkish behavior towards the internal Kurds was characterized by extremism, and this was evident in the exclusion of the Kurdish mayors from their positions, and the annulment of the membership of a number of the Democratic Peoples’ Representatives in Parliament. Turkey has also maintained its continued use of hard power against the Syrian Democratic Forces "SDF" in northern Syria, the latest of which was the killing of four "SDF" fighters last August by bombing carried out by a Turkish drone in northern Syria, in addition to the continuation of military operations against the PKK fighters. Northern Iraq.
On the other hand, the attack coincided with the escalation of political polarization inside Turkey, which was revealed by the growing tension between the ruling regime and its ally, the National Movement Party on the one hand, and the Turkish opposition parties on the other, especially the Peoples’ Democratic Party, the political wing of the PKK, which was evident in the rejection of The release of Salah al-Din Demirtas, the restriction of freedoms in southeastern regions of Turkey, not to mention the ongoing Turkish military operations against the PKK bases in northern Iraq, along with the targeting of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Here, it can be said that the local motives constituted one of the motivating contexts for Turkey to enter once again the cycle of violence and counter-violence, especially with the approaching elections scheduled for the middle of next year.
On a significant level, the Istanbul attack came with Turkey's tendency to intensify pressure on the regional and international parties involved in the Syrian scene, to pass the military campaign that it seeks to launch in northern Syria against the elements of the Syrian Democratic Republic, with the aim of stopping the Kurdish project, which Ankara sees as a threat to its national security. It is noteworthy that, since last May, Turkey has been threatening to launch a military operation targeting the sites of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij and Tal Rifaat, with the aim of establishing a safe area 30 kilometers deep that would serve as a security belt on its southern borders, but the United States, Russia, Iran and European countries announced their opposition. Any Turkish military move in northern Syria, warning of its danger to the region and efforts to combat terrorism.
Therefore, the Istanbul attack may indicate that the Kurdish movement, which Turkey accuses, may turn towards specific operations launched by its affiliated external groups in order to reduce Turkish pressure on it in the main areas in which it is active in northern Syria and Iraq, as well as to enhance its ability to convince its supporters. And his opponents at the same time that he is a card that is difficult to bypass in the region.
Possible repercussions
There are many potential effects of the Istanbul attack on Turkish political orientations at all levels, which can be stated as follows:
1- The militarization of the crisis with the Kurdish forces: Turkey may seek to invest in the Istanbul attack to legitimize its military interventions in northern Syria and Iraq. He said: The world must realize that Turkey will do what is necessary in light of the investigations. He added that his country will continue, "firmly, to implement its strategy to eliminate the threat of terrorism from its roots."
The Turkish president's statements were not the only ones that reinforce the trend towards the militarization of the scene in northern Syria and Iraq. On November 16, Reuters quoted a Turkish official as saying that Ankara intends to pursue targets in northern Syria, after it completes its operation against the PKK militants in northern Syria. Iraq. It is noteworthy that Turkey has repeatedly threatened to launch a new military operation in northern Syria, to remove the Kurdish groups from its borders, but the opposition of the United States, as well as Russia and Iran, prevented this.
In parallel with the above, the attack is expected to be reflected in the continuation of Turkish practices against the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) inside Turkey, by refusing to respond to European pressures to release the party's leader, Salah al-Din Demirtash, as well as tightening security measures in the regions of southeastern Turkey.
2- The rise in tension with Washington: Despite attempts to calm tensions with Washington during the last period, and Erdogan's optimism to pass the F16 aircraft deal after the Republicans won the majority in the midterm elections for Congress, the Istanbul attack may increase the areas of tension between the two countries, especially after The statements of Turkish Interior Minister Suleiman Soylu, who announced his country's rejection of a condolence message published by the US embassy in Ankara on the eve of the Istanbul attack, and said, "We do not accept... and reject the condolence offered by the US embassy... We know who supports terrorism in northern Syria, and we know the message they wanted Deliver it to Turkey through this attack." He added that "those who support terrorist organizations in northern Syria carried out the Istanbul attack," accusing the United States of supporting the Kurdish People's Protection Units in northern Syria.
3- Targeting Syrian refugees: The recent Istanbul attack contributed to the exacerbation of Turkish anger against Syrian refugees inside Turkey, and the targeting of Syrian refugees reached unprecedented levels among the Turks. Turkish tweeters need to expel the Syrians, not to mention the demand of some Turkish parties such as the right-wing Victory Party and the Republican People’s Party to expel the Syrians and deport them to their country, especially since the density of the Syrian refugees has increased the economic crisis in Turkey, and has plunged the country into a spiral of societal violence, he revealed. Violence and counter-violence between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees.
4- Obstructing settlement efforts with Damascus: In a statement following the targeting of Istiklal Street in the Turkish Taksim region, the Syrian government considered that this terrorist act is a blatant challenge to the international community, and that Syria condemns terrorism wherever it may be, but at the same time it denounced Turkey's attempts to exploit the Istanbul attack To launch a new military operation on the Kurdish-controlled areas in the north of the country, pledging to confront any Turkish attack. Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad confirmed in statements on November 15 that "the Turkish administration should not use these incidents as a pretext to take military steps in Syria that may exacerbate the existing situation."
5- The impact on the Turkish economy: The bombing that targeted the Taksim area in Istanbul has brought back concern to the economic sectors, especially the tourism sector, especially since the area in which the bombing occurred is one of the most important tourist destinations in the country, as it is visited daily by nearly two million tourists and passers-by. The timing of the attack came in light of the stressful economic conditions that Turkey suffers from, in the forefront of which are the decline in economic indicators, and the collapse of the currency price, which has lost about a third of its value since 2018. Therefore, the recent Istanbul attack carries negative repercussions on the Turkish economy, and at the heart of it is tourism that provides job opportunities. It accounts for about 20% of the labor force in Turkey, and contributes about 22% of the national product, not to mention its contribution to nearly 40% of the total taxes in the country.
6- Exposing security imbalances: The Istanbul attack cast a shadow over the Turkish intelligence immunity. As the incident opened the door to legitimate questions about the limits of the capabilities of the Turkish security services in securing vital areas in the country. Therefore, security measures are expected to escalate during the next stage.
In conclusion, it can be said that the Istanbul attack indicates the possibility of Turkey re-entering the cycle of violence and counter-violence with the Kurds, and that the pace of escalation between the two parties predicts the existence of more crises in the near future, especially after Turkey's confirmation of the Kurdistani's involvement in the recent attack, not to mention the Turkish president's threat of an operation. Close military forces in northern Syria, and an emphasis on continuing the pursuit of the PKK in northern Iraq.
