Turkey and the game of balance in the Iraqi crisis

Muhammad Almarafi

The Iraqi issue in general and the recent developments in Iraq in particular are receiving great attention in Turkish circles politically and economically. Differences between the two countries, particularly over border security and water, have not been able to put an obstacle to Ankara's relations with Baghdad's government and parties.

Turkey and Iraq New Testament

We return a little to understand the present context to the history of relations, especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century, where they took a major turn on both sides: Turkey: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, and has been holding it strongly since that time, and Iraq: the radical change that occurred in 2003, and the subsequent political and security changes.

It can be said that another stage was established in Turkish-Iraqi relations, and was affected by a number of factors, including:

On the Turkish side:

The Justice and Development Party's policy of opening up Turkey externally to neighboring countries, as the Iraqi arena seems to be a fertile and virgin ground for expanding influence, consolidating relations with Iraqi forces, and competing with regional players to achieve political, security and economic goals that we will refer to, in addition to sectarian and historical motives.

The desire of the party's leaders to prove their ability to resolve traditional files that previous governments were unable to deal with, most notably their border security concerns.

The Turkish need to find new solutions and alternatives to the economic situation, especially after the loss of US financial promises and the start of tension for many reasons in Turkey's relations with America and Europe and the latter's refusal to open the door to Ankara's entry into the European Union.

On the Iraqi side:

The dependence of Iraqi political forces on the external factor to strengthen their positions and internal capabilities, and certainly Turkey is one of the major regional players.

Security challenges, the fight against terrorism and the need for coordination with neighboring countries.

The great need for reconstruction and the revival of trade and tourism, Turkey is one of the largest producing countries in the region in various fields, and it represents a market and a corridor at the same time for Iraqi oil, especially from the north.

Turkey and the Iraqi Political Crisis

Since the 2021 elections in Iraq and the entry of political forces into the tunnel of government formation, Turkey's role in attracting the political compass has grown, maintaining the escalation of its presence gained in recent years, and in conjunction with the decline in the Iranian role revealed by the elections.

Despite the depth of relations between Turkey and the Iraqi forces, they work in soft diplomacy with multiple directions, and are keen to find a state of balance in their relations, with great interest in what is happening in Iraq, especially in the recent political crisis.

Connecting to the dental component

The presidential palaces in Ankara and Istanbul have turned into a destination for Iraqi politics, perhaps the most important and recent of which is the visit of Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi and his partner Khamis al-Khanjar and his meeting with Turkish leaders.

At Istanbul's Vahiddin Palace, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hosted Halbousi and Khanjar in a closed-door meeting in the presence of the intelligence chief.

According to a statement by Halbousi's office, the meeting included discussing "cooperation in the exchange of security and intelligence information," bilateral relations, economic and trade coordination, "as well as supporting Iraq in the field of combating terrorism."

In modifying the visit, Anadolu Agency ignored the mention of parliamentarian Khamis al-Khanjar, although it attached the news with a picture that puts it on the side of the officials present.

The Turkish role had previously succeeded, with the participation of other parties, in bringing together the heads of Halbousi and the dagger after the elections, after the differences between them reached the point of exchanging accusations and insults.

This brief and closed visit did not pass without interaction and reactions at home and abroad, at home from the competing political forces, especially the parties of the "Coordination Framework", which were apprehensive of the visit in support of the formation of the political majority government and pushing it outside the government framework, as Iran received from abroad as a warning of the continued decline of its political depth in regional competition, although the relations between Ankara and Tehran are strong and linked by common interests, especially economically and commercially, but this did not prevent an apparent struggle for influence in The region, particularly in Syria and Iraq.

Turkey's acquisition of the Halbousi and Dagger alliance card (Azm), which won the second largest number of seats in the Iraqi elections after the Sadrist movement, is a major political gain, which enhances the continuous escalation of the Turkish role in the Iraqi arena, especially since (Azm) within his participation in the next government through the agreement with Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr and the Kurdistan Democrat, and the latter is of course one of the most close Iraqi parties and relations with Turkey, and it can seek through the two allies to build bridges with the Sadrists, and they represent the force According to the results of the elections, the most prominent politician is within the Shiite component, and with this equation, Ankara can win the round in achieving the balance it targeted against Tehran.

But the Iranians did not suffice their hands about what is happening, as they worked to mobilize all forms of pressure on the political forces, Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni, Iran does not see that it is less able to move pressure on its new and old friends from the Iraqi components, as it has old political and economic relations with the Kurdistan Democrat, and it also considers itself indebted to Halbousi for years of support and reads in his recent moves, especially his visit to Turkey, a coup that called for impatience, and it is not certain whether Halbousi is ready To risk stubbornness against Iran's stubbornness, which could threaten its political fortunes, especially since Tehran warned it through many messages not to proceed on the path of excluding the framework, and it will not accept that it depends on Turkey to achieve its future ambitions, because the past of its rise was in alliance with its allies in the 2018 elections.

Contact the Kurdish component

In early February, the presidential complex in Ankara was the site of the meeting between Turkish President Erdogan and the architect of Kurdish-Turkish relations, Nechirvan Barzani, a few days before the session that was supposed to be held on February 7, which was dedicated to resolving the position of the President of the Republic, which was usually allocated to the Kurds, but its quorum was not completed.

According to a statement from the presidency of the region, Nechirvani's visit included a discussion of "areas of joint cooperation, the Iraqi political situation and the latest developments in the region" and "the desire of the two parties to consolidate trade and economic relations," because "Turkey is a key partner of the Kurdistan region, as the volume of trade exchange with the region is more than 10 billion dollars annually, and the same with the government of Iraq, as well as the region's oil is exported via pipelines to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, as well as long-term agreements" between them, and the consultations also included the file of "talks Between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi Federal Government and the latest steps taken to resolve differences and border tensions.

The timing of the visit was not surprising, as it came after the heated controversy at home, although some websites and parties ostensibly expressed surprise at the timing of the visit and not announcing it in advance, while observers know that the Kurdish side cannot ignore the position of the Turks and their opinion of what is happening in the neighborhood, and in return ignore the opinion of the Iraqi forces on diplomatic visits or economic relations linking the region with abroad in general.

Turkey did not delay in responding to Iran's message and condemning the recent rocket attacks on Erbil in mid-March, for which the IRGC claimed responsibility, with Ankara strongly condemning these attacks as "actions aimed at undermining peace and stability in Iraq."

The Erbil attack can be read as a strongly worded message from Tehran to the Kurds, in which it expressed its dissatisfaction with the political and security movements taking place in northern and neighboring Iraq, and Iran sees it as a threat to its interests and security, and wants to remind the region of its ability and not ignore its influence.

Relations with the Shiite component

Since 2003, the Shiite component has not had clear relations with Ankara, and on the contrary, it has had close relations with its rival Tehran.

With the head of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, becoming prime minister, the tone of hostility escalated, marking a period of decline in relations between the two countries, with Maliki publicly accusing his Turkish counterpart of provoking the situation in Iraq, while Mr. Erdogan responded by accusing Maliki of seeking to provoke a civil war in the country.

Of course, Maliki's positions and statements represent a title for the nature of the relations of the powers close to Iran with Turkey, and among the reasons for this deterioration are: the military operations carried out by the Turkish forces on the border with Iraq, and the economic agreements between them and the regional authority, including the oil agreements signed by Erbil without the consent of Baghdad.

With the arrival of Haider al-Abadi as prime minister, the situation with the Turkish side did not improve, and may even worsen, for the same reasons. Although the Sadrist movement is not counted among the "Coordination Framework" parties, on the contrary, its leader, Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, has always raised his objection to the two points referred to.

International and regional developments and the location of Iraq

During his flight back from Ukraine to Turkey in early February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seemed to be apprehensive about the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, especially on the oil and gas sector.

Mr. Erdogan has stated that Iraq may supply his country with natural gas, although he stressed that Turkey is not currently facing a shortage of gas stocks.

The Turkish president pointed out that there are internal voices in Turkey claiming the shortage of natural gas reserves in the country, explaining that the fact of this is a temporary problem originating from the Iranian side, and it has been solved, and Mr. Erdogan did not hide that he discussed the possibility of supplying Turkey with natural gas with the President of the region, Nechirvan Barzani, during his recent visit.

Oil sources have previously revealed a movement in the project to export gas to Turkey from the Khurmu gas fields in Erbil and Chamchamal in Sulaymaniyah, and the Turks have shown keen interest in this file, in revival of previous understandings, where the role of developing and investing these two fields and others is located.

It should be noted that the embargo imposed on Russia due to the Ukraine crisis has put a number of countries, such as Turkey, in an awkward position, and Turkish Energy Minister Alp Arslan Bayraktar frankly stressed that his country will continue to buy oil and gas from Moscow, as it depends on the latter for 45% of its demand for natural gas, 17% of oil and 40% of gasoline, and that it cannot so quickly replace its supplies from Russia as a "reliable old supplier."

A number of Iraqi parties want to accelerate Turkey's investment in Iraqi gas, saying that Iraq can also benefit from it to meet its local needs and get rid of dependence on Iran, but this desire collides with the opposite desire.

In conclusion, it can be clearly diagnosed that the Turkish role in Iraq is heading towards the rise in general, and it had a clear feature through the current crisis, as it had a role in bringing the Sunni forces and parties closer, and continues to deepen its relations with the Kurds, and Ankara's desire to ensure strong relations with the Iraqi government and forces is evident, and this need began to increase immediately with recent developments.