What if the Taliban won?

Dr.. Atheer Nazim Al-Jassoor.

The question that may be asked at the present time and the events taking place in Afghanistan, which will certainly have repercussions on the regional and international environments, is the Taliban today the same as the Taliban of 2001? Or will it use different political and diplomatic mechanisms and tools? The movement today and after these years of Pursuit, guerrilla warfare, and the gradual stages it went through throughout these years. Today, it necessarily differs in terms of military and political technique and tactics. In the past, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the de facto ruler of Afghanistan. Today, it will search for the largest number of those specifically recognized. Of the regional powers who are considered key players in the region and the world, in addition to the major and superpowers, you will find in the Taliban first a fait accompli and secondly a security imperative that must be dealt with with caution and rationality. In terms of military tactics, it differs from the years 1996 and the methods it practiced, both in the face of crises and internal divisions. One of the axioms of the movements of these groups and groups similar to them is that they are developing in thinking and orientation and are working to develop their methods of confrontation with various orientations, and in 2001 the method of polarization and loyalties was also the cause of their downfall in addition to the military superiority they faced by the United States and NATO.

Since the war on Afghanistan in the year 2001 as a result of the events of September 11th in the same year, the United States has been busy arranging the Afghan internal situation, whether in talking about achieving security and peace at home or by supporting the elements that the United States believed were qualified to lead this sensitive stage From the age of the state in Afghanistan, in addition to the financial support, armament, training and military operations in support of the young Afghan army against the groupings of the movement, whether inside Afghanistan or on the common borders with Pakistan, but the American action did not generate anything but corrupt governments whose corruption penetrated the various vital and sovereign institutions, which made it difficult Restoring the political and social stability of this country. All these, in addition to the tribal social complexity that Afghanistan enjoys, have contributed to the entanglement of the Afghan internal scene. This is in addition to the regional and international interventions that contribute not only to Afghanistan, but also to every point of the factor in the spread of chaos and political instability.

Many may believe that the emergence of the Taliban movement in this way is an issue that proceeds in two matters. The first is that the Taliban movements are a natural reaction to the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces, and the second focuses on that there is an agreement in secret between the movement and the United States, and the two things condemn it to the US policy in dealing with events. And its repercussions on the regional situation in particular, but the truth is that the movement, through its leaders, has studied this situation and was fully prepared for this moment after they were able to be an important figure in the Afghan equation after the American withdrawal, due to the internal conditions of sagging, miscalculation and management, in addition to The tribal support that the movement will receive, especially since it is one of the largest tribes (Pashtuns) who make up more than 45% of Afghan society in addition to the tribes loyal to it, in addition to the movement’s intellectual principles that are commensurate with many Islamic movements in Afghanistan and in the countries of the region, even those that may differ. With it in the vision, perceptions, and sometimes goals, therefore, what some call military collapses are in fact divided into two parts. The first is moving towards the loyalties of many soldiers, whether in belief or tribal affiliation to this or that tribe. It suffers from a great slackness and a crack in the hierarchy of leadership, in addition to rampant corruption, as well as the lack of law and governmental protection, which makes the fighter confused if he encounters such groups, knowing that he did not find government cover to protect him or his family after the announcement of his bounce. 

The talk about power-sharing ended with the movement's control over the centers of power and decision-making in Afghanistan, given that the Afghan equation differed a few days before the movement's movement and its arrival in Kabul. The panic that we see on the faces of the Afghans, therefore, will be a natural state, and the Afghan people will coexist with the situation. There is no escape from this reality, which will certainly last because of what regional and international countries call new arrangements and redraw new strategies as well to deal with the current Afghan situation, and due to the length of these arrangements, the Afghan society cannot It determines whether there are actors in it who can be a party, a movement, or a gathering that deals with the situation of the country and at this critical stage. Therefore, the movement works to follow the details of internal life and secure the borders with its regional opponents outwardly, and works to rearrange the interior according to their principles and perceptions. The movement It will move away from direct confrontation externally until the home front is secured and their internal influence is strengthened by changing the method used in    the past

The international community, stunned by this event, will deal with it according to a number of security arrangements, the most important of which are related to terrorism and its export, and whether the Taliban's seizure of power will be a signal to other armed groups in the region and beyond to move within this framework, especially since some of these countries suffer from fragility and chaos. It allows this experience to be repeated in different and multiple ways. Therefore, the recognition today of the Taliban movement as the de facto ruler of Afghanistan may expand its scope than in the past, not out of belief in the movement, but rather to secure the borders in the first place and the movement’s commitment to a set of agreements and procedures that prevent it from embracing other terrorist groups as it did in the past with Al-Qaeda organization, and so that the Afghan lands will not be a launching pad for attacks and aggressions against other countries, but this does not mean that the movement will dispense with the work of these groups if it is necessary for them to become arms through which they try to confront the attacks or to carry out armed movements to prevent the danger, in the end it will be dealing with the movement Likewise, according to the decisions stipulated by it, in accordance with international law, not with intentions and skepticism. The movement's tactic today is different from the past, and regional dealings with it will be different based on interest and abstract politics far from affiliations, loyalties, and ideology. The movement's strategy today will move as far as possible from direct confrontation and from the singularity of war at the present time. at least

The other issue is to look into whether the Taliban movement is able to deal with the internal situation and arrange its cards with the international community. Here, a question arises as to whether this progress will be a catalyst for the other existing movements, whether they are based or those that are sleeper cells, to try to make the second version of this model. Who is it emulating in the idea of establishing Islamic rule on the model of the Taliban, whether in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria?, And what is the amount of support that will be provided to it from today’s countries that are main supporters in the region of the Taliban and its likes?, especially since the political systems in some countries are similar to the defeated Afghan political system in terms of Confusion, the extent of corruption, and the suffering of its citizens. The scale of resentment in these countries and others helped the base of their political systems to be fragile and unstable, unable to absorb crises and risks due to the imbalances they suffer in institutions, social structures, and mismanagement of the state. The idea of restoring these organizations to the arena of these countries is still on Considering that the war ended with it in Iraq at the very least, but there are groupings for it at this point or that, and it is still present in Syria and controls areas even if it is limited, but it is still working according to its principles on which it was founded. Therefore, we do not rule out that these groups are active It is trying once again to impose its control on the areas it ruled in Iraq and is trying to regain its lands in Syria, especially since it has internal support in these countries in addition to international and regional support within the arena of conflict and competition between these forces, and this does not prevent the growth of these groups in Egypt and Yemen. And Libya, and here we will start talking about power-sharing projects between the governments of these countries and the leadership of these groups, which may differ from the Afghan experience