Kais Saied's coup and its reflection on legitimacy

Eng. Sima Ali Mahdi

This is the second coup in Tunisia after Ben Ali's coup in 1987 against Bourguiba, but the difference between them is that the rule that it did not change the nature of the first authority, but rather came to complete its course in his monopoly in power and the repression of his opponents. As for the coup d'état of Kais Saied,  he announced on the evening  of July 25, 2021 Ezzto the Prime Minister (Hisham Mechichi), freezing the powers of Parliament, lifting the immunity of deputies, and assuming the presidency of the Public Prosecution,  A number of ministers, most notably the ministers of interior, justice and defense, were dismissed, several state institutions were suspended, and amonth-long night curfew  was provided. The decisions, which he described as “exceptional”, were announced in the presence of army and security leaders, which raised the eyebrows of political leaders after an event that the security services had never done before due to their neutrality and the confidence of Tunisians over the years following the change.

Causes of the coup

On October 13, 2019, Sa’iwon the presidency of the republic as an independent and non-partisan presidential candidate, and did not have a political program, and his election campaign focused on his person, credibility, support for the revolution, and his direct speeches with the people. Upon his arrival, Kais Saied was frank about his position rejecting the form of the system approved by the constitution, and expressed his intention to changeit, for several reasons, including:

1-  The performance of the Mechichi government in providing services to Tunisian citizens declined.

2- The rampant corruption in vital sectors of the state, including within the political class and in electoral fraud, and even the judiciary, which was considered the main hinge of justice by leaving judicial files left for several years unresolved due to mediation and influence.

3- The large number of popular protests demanding an improvement in the living and health situation, especially after the Corona crisis.

4- The exchange of accusations within the House of Representatives, which turned into a similar to the qualifying arenas and not a place for legislation.

In light of this, the British  website (Middle East Eye) announced a  secret document,  two months before the coup,  talking about the  arrest of  senior politicians, and the  orchestration of a  coup in Tunisia with reference to Article Eighty of the  Tunisian Constitution, and the document (  that   this coup  is a (constitutional coup) to be the sole "Kais Saied" in power completely, andthat after luring Prime Minister "Hisham Mechichi"  and Speaker of the House of Representatives  "Rached Ghannouchi"To the palace and  their detentionthere, will  appoint Major General Khaled Yahyaoui acting Minister of Interior), and   this was the first  indication of  the coup,  and indeed this is what happened, but  the  head of   the Ennahda Party   Rached Ghannouchi was  His health condition is critical and H. H. was not  arrested.

A political crisis with a constitutional cover

   Consideration of the constitutional issue, and in particular the issue of the division of powers in the provisions of theTunisian constitution, may at first glance suggest that the constitution worked to clearly separate these three powers by clarifying the powers of each authority and the boundaries that separate them.  On the  other hand, it remains hostage to constitutional loopholes that open the door to interpretations resulting from the lack of clarity in the responsibilities and powers of those authorities, and even the ways of dealing in the event of their intersection between the President  of the Republic and the Prime Minister, and the  most important differences focused on the formation of governments and the selection of candidates and ministers. What made it more difficult to form a government was the fact that no party or bloc obtained a majority of seats in parliament due to the adoption of the proportional list voting system, which makes it difficult for lists of candidates to obtain an absolute majority of parliamentary seats, as is currently the case in Iraq.

In his decisions, President Sa'i D. relied mainly on Article 80 of the  2014 Constitution,  especially its first paragraph, which stipulates that "in the event of an imminent danger threatening the entity of the homeland and the security and independence of the country, which makes it impossible for the normal functioning of the state, to take the measures necessitated by this exceptional situation, after consulting the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and informing the President of the Constitutional Court, and announcing the measures in a statement to the people....).

1-  Consulting the head of government and the speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (both of which were not actually consulted) and informing the president of the  Constitutional Court has not yet been  established and its members have not yet been installed, although it is enshrined in the 2014 constitutional document (articles 118  and  124), and perhaps the  only condition that the President of the Republic has been keen to implement is the declaration of the state of exception in an official statement addressed to the people.

2-  Limiting the purpose of the "exceptional measures" to "the return of the normal functioning of the state as  soon as possible", i.e. restricting the legitimacy of the "exceptional measures      " by ensuring the return of the country to normal after  the removal of the imminent danger and its repercussions, while meeting the Assembly of the Representatives of the People in permanent session for the duration of the exceptional measures» This is contrary to what was stipulated in the decisions of President Sa'iD on July 25,  2021, when he decided to suspend the work of parliament and lift the immunity of its deputies.

3-  (Thirty days after the entry into force of these measures, and at any time thereafter, the Constitutional Court, at the request of the Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People or thirty of its members, shall be entrusted with deciding whether or not the state of exception continues, and the Court shall declare its decision publicly within a maximum period of fifteen days)In the absence of the  Constitutional Court, as already noted, on August 23, 2021, President  Sa'iD issued another  decisionextending the state of exception until further notice.

The Tunisian crisis is not only a constitutional crisis, but also of a complex, political and socio-economic nature, therefore, it  is not excludedthat his own way of interpreting the constitution ends with the drafting of a  new document, which the people are asked to approve through the referendum mechanism, as long as it freezes the work of parliament,  as the  current constitution guarantees, in article 143, the president of the republic or a third of parliament the right to initiate its amendment, and The president's decisions were  not surprising to   some extent, as his skepticism about the usefulness of representative democracy dates back to his election campaign and to the first months of his election, and he strongly supported the  constitutional document that was agreed upon in  2014,   stressing that it was placed on the size of some of the weighty political forces in Tunisian party life,  and did not hesitate to call for Tunisia desperately needs to rewrite its constitution.

Kais Saied and the dissolution of parliament in Tunisia

Tunisian President Kais Sa'i D announced in a speech broadcast on Tunisian state television while chairing a meeting of the National Security Council on March 30,  2022, the dissolution of the suspended parliament, as  Sa'i D said in  his speech that he "took the decision to dissolve the Tunisian parliament based on Article 72 of the constitution "in order to preserve the Tunisian people and state institutions" and this is due to:

1-  The Tunisian president's decision to dissolve the frozen parliament came against the backdrop of 120  deputies holding a virtual session, a session that resulted in a decision to cancel the exceptional measures taken on July 25, as  116  deputies of the participants  voted yes, and the deputies participating in the session confirmed their rejection of the presidential decree on the dissolution of the Supreme Judicial Council, and their non-recognition of the legitimacy of the new interim council, and the participants denounced what they described  as "Trial of civilians before military courts", and called for the opening of a comprehensive national dialogue to save the country from its political, economic and social crisis.

2-  The decision to dissolve the frozen parliament coincided with the complexity of the Tunisian political scene, and the call of many political forces for a comprehensive national dialogue, paving the way for a consensus between political forces on the mechanisms for resolving this  crisis, in  addition to the worsening of the economic crisis in light of the delay in paying the salaries of some government sector institutions, the shortage of some basic materials from the Tunisian market, and the dispute between the government of Najla Boden and the Tunisian General Labor Union (the  most important trade union institution in Tunisia).On the economic reform plan, the Union rejects the economic reforms proposed by the Tunisian government to obtain funding from the IMF, especially as they include "stopping employment, freezing wages for 5  years in the public sector, selling some public companies, and lifting subsidies permanently within 4 years."

Reactions to Kais Saied's decisions

  Reactions to the trend witnessed by the Tunisian scene continued after Kais Saied announced the adoption of a set of exceptional measures, and they were frequent among the positions of domestic, regional and international actors, the most prominent of which were as follows:

Level I: Internal Positions of the Parties

1-  The party blocs rejecting the decision, the most prominent of which were (Ennahda Movement - Dignity Coalition Bloc - Republican Party - Tunisian Workers' Party - Free Destourian Party).

2-  The party blocsthat supported the decision, the most prominent of which was (the Democratic Current - Qalb Tounes Party) and their support is dueto the chaos that pervades the parliament square, which is suspended for its work.

3-  Tunisian General Labor Union: Calling for the need to respect rights and freedoms in light of their implementation. He stressed the need for all parties to show the spirit of responsibility required by the stage away from political squabbles and settling scores between the parties to the crisis. He pointed out the need to review measures relating to the judiciary to ensure its independence.

4-  The Supreme Judicial Council rejected the decision, stressing  after meeting with the President of the Republic a number of its members, that judges are independent and have no authority over them in their judiciary other than the law and that they carry out their duties in accordance with the Constitution and the law in protecting rights and freedoms, stressing that the Public Prosecution is part of the judicial judiciary, whose members and members enjoy the same rights and guarantees granted to the sitting judiciary, and exercise their duties as required by the legal texts in force.

5-  The Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE): Through its president (Nabil Afoun), she expressed her shock at the decisions announced by the President of the Republic, ruling out talk of early elections in light of the constitutional vacuum left by Saied's exceptional decisions.

Level II: Positions of Regional and International Parties

1-  The statements concerned about the coup in Tunisia were made by (Turkey, Libya, the United Nations, the United States of America, and the European Union).

2-  The supporting permits were taken by (Egypt - Saudi Arabia - UAE - Maghreb countries)

3-  Qatar adopted the neutral statement by calling for the need to give priority to the  voice of wisdom and avoid escalation between the parties to the crisis in Tunisia, through the path of dialogue to overcome the crisis that the country is going through, consolidate the foundations of institutions and enshrine the rule of law in order to preserve the stability of Tunisia and achieve the aspirations and aspirations of its people.

In conclusion, it can be said that the success of any democratic transition depends on going through three basic stages: the first / the stage of openness, in which the regime begins to make reforms and free some restrictions on civil and political life due to popular pressure.

The second / the transitional period, in which new foundations are laid for the political system and institutions, most notably the drafting of a new constitution.

Third, it is the stabilization phase in which democratic behavior becomes entrenched among actors and institutions, and the peaceful transfer of power through elections becomes a fundamental rule in the state.

Tunisia has succeeded in the previous two stages and failed in the last stage   through Kais Saied's coup against political and constitutional legitimacy with justifications, albeit convincing, and it also seems that the President of the Republic deals with Article  80 as a "magic" gate  out of the narrow constitutional legitimacy to the rehab of popular legitimacy for him, which turns the chapter into a bridge towards a new transitional period for the country ending with the "Third Republic". The recent decision to dissolve the Tunisian parliament will motivate the Tunisian president to complete his vision for a radical restructuring of the political system in Tunisia, especially in the absence of the Constitutional Court, a consideration that makes him solely have the power to interpret constitutional chapters.