One Iraqi nation.. and three groups!

I have been wrestling with the editorial management in writing this article. Because of the anxiety and confusion to deal with the term (the nation), until I reached my last chance to postpone writing. And here it is necessary that there is no need for it. Although it - that is, the editorial board - has struggled and exerted efforts in its attempt to dismantle the idea and the term, and to search for its roots, by reviewing different points of view; To reveal what is ambiguous about understanding, all of this is an attempt to achieve the content after rooting the theory. This was done through writing and translating the elite of those who wrote about it.

However, I still believe that there is an overlap and complexity between the term (nation), whether it is Iraqi, Persian, American, etc., and other terms such as (patriotism) or (national identity). Among them, for example, overlapping in essence and the possibility of verification, formation and formation, in causes and conditions - I mean all those terms, of course -.

I wrote and wrote the books of the best colleagues - whom I know and other researchers who are absent from me - in the dimensions of the search for deconstructing meaning - I mean the nation - or finding it in (Iraqi), individuals and groups, or even (components) as our politicians express, may God protect and preserve them!

And the attempts of our Islamic thinker and writer (Jawad Ali Kassar) in his book (Iraqi Nationalism... Challenges of the Iranian and Turkish Projects) are far from us. He was preceded, or followed in his footsteps, by fellow researchers (Salim Matar, Ibrahim Al-Abadi, Hussein Darwish Al-Adly, and Dr. Ali Taher Al-Hamoud) in various articles and writings. And I can claim that all these attempts undoubtedly produced and will produce a lot on the level of reflection and thinking, until the stage of (creation).

However, the deepening of the Iraqis' relationship with (their state) remains the most important reason - from my point of view - that reveals their division mainly into three groups. There is no room for equivocation - as researchers - to turn a blind eye to revealing it and talking about it with the mind of the enlightened researcher, not with the tongue of those who are flat in their awareness and who are frozen in their thoughts. The relationship of the Shiites with the modern Iraqi state, since its early days, was so confused that it prevented them from participating in its institutions to a large extent. All this under various pretexts, including the relationship of the British to its establishment after the overthrow of the Ottoman (Muslim) state, despite the great injustice and exclusion that befell the Shiites under it at the expense of the Sunni Arabs, who had the largest presence in terms of role and representation. The Shiites' relationship with the state remained turbulent, even after their wide participation in power after 2003, by pushing and stimulating the religious authority in Najaf. It was difficult for ordinary Shiites to disentangle and distinguish between opposition to (authority) or disagreement with it on the one hand, and the need to protect (the state) as the main protector from persecution in the event that its foundations are established on the basis of justice and fairness on the other hand. The generation of change inherited the crisis of the relationship with (the state) from parents and grandparents. Thus, large segments of Shiites still feel their crisis with (rule), (authority) and (state). And each one of them has a meaning known from the philosophical point of view.

As for the (Sunnis), their reference throughout history is (the state), but which (state)? The country ruled by (the guardian) (Muslim) (Sunni). Thus, the fluctuation in understanding that relationship emerged when the rule of (the state) of change was (a guardian) (Shiite)! This is what allowed the influence of Salafist groups that tried to provide a practical alternative to the absence of the (guardian), in which the conditions of (guardianship) are consistent, including his (sect). The vast majority of Iraqis (Sunnis) fell prey to the ideas of these groups. Because there are no answers to the claim of imbalance in the specifications of the (guardian) put forward by these groups. In addition to the feelings of marginalization and exclusion that have grown in that social milieu that had owned the state’s capabilities for decades.

The (Kurds) were not in the best condition in their relationship with the Iraqi (state). On the contrary, the relationship during the past ten decades was based on the trusteeship of the Arab (centre) over the Kurdish (region) on the one hand, and the dealings of (the Kurds) with the center on the basis of surrender to the objective circumstance that prevents the formation of their independent (state). All of this is in the midst of a cultural and social nurturing that wants to convince the Kurds that the cultural difference between the Arab and Kurdish nationalities will remain a barrier to the feeling that they are part of Iraq, except in terms of necessity and need, not in terms of conviction, faith and belief.

If (Abraham), peace be upon him, was alone (one nation) as expressed by the Qur’an, then the most prominent meaning and expected value of the harmonious Iraqi nation is that it has an opinion that regulates the relationship of the three (groups) - or if you like to say the three (components) - with their state that represents them and takes care of their interests, Peace!