Opposition: Culture and Practice

Abbas Al-Anbouri

Since the announcement of the election results and until the writing of these lines, there has been much discussion about the importance of an opposition within Parliament, especially given the insistence shown by the Sadrist bloc in forming a government that it described as a national majority government.
It has also become a given that most or all of the new parties that won a number of seats, if we add to them another number of independents, will choose to go to the opposition. The expected total number of opposition parliamentary representatives will be around (30-35) representatives. They are the backbone of the group of blocs, which are: (New Generation - Imtidad - Ishraqat Kanun), in addition to some independent representatives who joined them.
This small number of opposition representatives will not constitute a political force to curb the traditional political blocs, which are expected to participate in forming the government, if we take into account the two main challenges facing the new opposition forces, which areThe lack of parliamentary experience among the new opposition forces, in contrast to the accumulated political and parliamentary experience of the traditional parties, on the one hand, and the lack of a common, unifying vision and comprehensive program that brings all these small blocs under its umbrella, on the other. Certainly, this does not mean ignoring the possibility of the opposition—taking into account the role of its individual representatives—carrying out its legislative and oversight role in directing questions and inquiries.

Even questioning the executive authority, despite its limited impact, in the absence of a large coalition capable of threatening to withdraw confidence from executive authority officials. The idea behind the opposition in classical parliamentary systems lies in its ability to form a shadow government that works to bring down the existing government and presents itself as an alternative to it.Either during the parliamentary session or the elections that follow. All of this is assuming the existence of a small opposition that does not exceed 10% of the number of parliament members. However, if the Coordination Framework or some of its blocs resort toOr other blocs, from the Kurds and Sunnis, joining the opposition. It can be expected that they—the opposition—could form a stronger force, able to coordinate with the smaller, less experienced opposition blocs to showcase their capabilities to the blocs that will form the government. This is an unlikely possibility, so far!