Doubts persist Why do Saudi caveats about opening up to Turkey persist?

Karam Saeed / Deputy Managing Editor of Al-Democrat Magazine

Turkish-Saudi relations have witnessed a remarkable development since the end of 2020, and the indicators of détente between the two countries accelerated with the Turkish president's visit to Riyadh last April, which contributed to breaking the iceberg between the two countries, then the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Muhd bin Salman to Ankara on June 22, to reveal a Turkish desire mainly to normalize relations, and jump on the severe political crisis that erupted between them following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in His country's consulate in Turkey, accusing the Justice and Development Government, the Saudi crown prince of orchestrating the incident. It is noteworthy that within the framework of Ankara's efforts to gradually return to the policy of "zeroing problems", it sought to reduce the tension that has escalated in relations with Riyadh, which was also reflected in the statements of Turkish officials, as the Turkish president announced last February that his country aspires to overcome its differences with Riyadh, and stressed that there are many areas of economic and political cooperation that his country can share with Riyadh. The Saudi Foreign Minister also received his Turkish counterpart in May 2021 as well as their meeting again on July 16, 2021, on the sidelines of the International Conference on Central Asia and South Asia held in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent. In parallel with the previous steps, the spokesman for the Turkish presidency stressed on January 4 that 2022 will be a year of new regional openings, and will witness an acceleration in normalization steps.

Cooling tension

Ankara and Riyadh sought to ease tensions a year and a half ago, as evident in the Turkish president's call to the Saudi king in November.

2020, and his emphasis on the importance of improving relations with Riyadh and resolving thorny files through dialogue, which prompted the Saudi Foreign Minister to respond to this call by emphasizing that the Kingdom has wonderful relations with Turkey and there are no data indicating the existence of a non-official boycott of Turkish products (1). In November 2020, Saudi Arabia also provided relief aid to the victims of the earthquake that struck the Turkish region of Izmir. In parallel, Riyadh sought to strengthen its military relationship with Ankara, as the Turkish president revealed in March 2021 a Saudi request for a batch of Turkish drones. Turkey's moves to bridge the gap with Riyadh were not limited  to the above, as the spokesman for the Turkish presidency announced in April 2021 that his country welcomed the trial conducted by Saudi Arabia for those accused of killing Khashoggi in Istanbul, a position that contradicts previous Turkish positions that questioned the integrity and law of the Saudi trial, which is a fundamental shift in the Turkish position. The most exciting move came in April 2022, as the Turkish judiciary referred Khashoggi's case to Turkish Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ said he would agree to the prosecutor's request to refer the case to Saudi Arabia because it had been "too long."

The court's orders cannot be applied to foreign defendants. In the same context, Turkey announced in March 2022 its support for Saudi Arabia's bid to host Expo 2030 (2). It was also remarkable that the Turkish efforts to improve relations with Riyadh are parallel to President Erdogan's efforts to increase his country's role in the Gulf region, and secure its interests in the region, as Ankara is anticipating the rapprochement in Iranian-Gulf relations, and the developments that the region has been witnessing since the Al-Ula Gulf Summit in January 2021. Different motives:  The motives for the Turkish-Saudi rapprochement at this time can be addressed as follows :

1 - Reviving the Turkish economy: By supporting its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia at this time, Turkey aims to strengthen economic relations between the two countries, not only with the decline of the Turkish economy, as debt stocks rose, which rose to about 42 percent of GDP at the end of 2021, not to mention the lira losing more than 40 percent of its value against the dollar after the Turkish president ordered the Central Bank to cut interest rates four times in a row in recent months. In In this context, Saudi Arabia represents one of the possible lifelines for the Turkish economy, whether from the point of view of being the largest Gulf market for Turkish exports, or from the point of view of being a financial force that can inject investments inside Turkey. ~ In this context, Turkey also seeks to benefit from the Saudi financial abundance, and given the Kingdom's huge investment opportunities in Turkey, Ankara seeks to benefit from these investments, and strengthen its presence at the current stage, in light of the suffering of the national currency lira, and the rise of suspicions of foreign investors in the Turkish economy. The figures indicate that the volume of Saudi investments in Turkey exceeds two billion dollars, not to mention that Saudis are among the most nationalities that visit Turkey for tourism and investment. The real estate sector is also one of the most important Turkish sectors that are witnessing demand by Saudi investors, as Turkish official data indicate that the amount of Saudi investment in the real estate field reaches 30 percent. The number of Saudi companies investing in the Turkish real estate sector has reached more than 400 companies, with Saudi capital. It is noteworthy that the Turkish economy has suffered a remarkable setback since 2018 due to the policy of the informal ban imposed by the Kingdom on Turkish exports after the relationship between the two countries entered the shipping climate against the backdrop of escalating tension over controversial files such as the conflict file in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. On January  3, 2022, the Turkish business community called on the Turkish president to move towards helping solve the problem of exporting to Saudi Arabia, given its negative repercussions on the reality of the Turkish economy, as the data of the Turkish Statistics Authority revealed that Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia decreased from $ 3.2 billion at the end of 2019, to reach about $ 2.5 billion at the end of 2020. Turkish exports to the Saudi market have also declined to record levels. It reached about $ 235 million at the end of November 2021, while Saudi exports to Turkey achieved a historical record of reaching more than $ 3 billion (3).

2 - Confronting the Iranian civilization  :

Turkey's moves to moisten the relationship with Riyadh coincide with Iran's efforts to repair its Gulf relations, and this has been reflected in Iran's involvement since the beginning of the year.

2021 in direct talks with Saudi Arabia under Iraqi auspices, nearly six years after severing diplomatic relations between them. In addition to the above, in June 2022, Tehran and Riyadh achieved a qualitative leap towards resolving outstanding issues, breaking the level of escalation. Here, it is possible to understand the Turkish concern about the reflection of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement on the Turkish role and interests in the Gulf region, and Turkey fears that the development in the relationship between Tehran and Riyadh to resolve the controversial issues between them will reflect on the influence of Turkey in the region, the Biden administration, which is betting on the success of the nuclear negotiations with Tehran, is moving strongly towards supporting and encouraging Iran and Saudi Arabia to reach an understanding in Yemen as a confidence-building measure. In this context, Ankara seems more keen at the moment to clear the outstanding differences with Saudi Arabia, in order to prevent Iran, its sectarian rival and its most prominent regional rival.

3 - Absorbing Western pressures: The Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is not separated in a significant part from the desire of the two countries to absorb the Western pressures to which Ankara and Riyadh are exposed, as far as Riyadh is concerned, tension has reached a peak with the Biden administration, which has directed harsh criticism of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh's human rights file, until President Biden promised during his election campaign to turn Saudi Arabia into a "pariah state" with the developments of the crisis in Yemen. The tension curve escalated in April 2021, against the backdrop of the president's decision US Joe Biden withdrew part of his country's forces in the region and directed them to other areas, which opened the doors to speculation about the repercussions that may result from this step. The number of permanent U.S. Department of Defense employees in the Gulf states is more than 10,000, including about 9,500 military. In May 2020, the United States withdrew two Patriot missile batteries from Saudi Arabia that it had sent following the attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019, in addition to fighter jets and US military personnel (N-4). The relationship also entered the shipping climate between Riyadh and Washington with the worsening repercussions of the Ukraine war on energy prices, and Riyadh's disregard for US demands to raise its oil production. To compensate for the decline in Moscow's share in global markets, not to mention Riyadh's refusal to clearly align itself with the United States against Moscow after the latter's military intervention in Ukraine (5). On the other hand, the Turkish quest for rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is linked to the file of Turkish relations with Western powers, and the escalating political conflict with the United States and the European Union in recent years, which reached its peak with Washington's announcement on December 27 to monitor Turkish exports of drones, and track their repercussions on US national security, not to mention Turkey's continued exclusion from the F35  air fighter production program due to its possession of the Russian S400 missile defense system.In addition, the Biden administration continues to criticize President Erdogan's authoritarian practices, accusing him of nationalizing the public sphere. Turkish-European relations have also entered the shipping climate, in light of the European Union's continued opposition to Turkey's accession to the European Union, not to mention Europe's opposition to Turkish moves to explore for energy reservoirs in the eastern Mediterranean, and to confirm its bias towards Greece and Cyprus in their conflict with Ankara. Accordingly, Turkey seeks to strengthen its relations with Saudi Arabia with the aim of forming an alliance with it through which it can manage relations with the West or at least neutralize Saudi Arabia towards the contentious issues between Turkey and its adversaries in the West, not only with Riyadh's move towards deepening military and political relations with Cyprus and Greece.

4 - Employing rapprochement internally: The Saudi-Turkish rapprochement during the current stage is linked to the priorities of the political leadership in the two countries, while the Turkish president seems in urgent need of repairing the relationship with Riyadh, ahead of the electoral maturity scheduled for the middle of next year, especially since the tension in the relationship with Saudi Arabia was reflected in the movement of exports of Turkish companies to Riyadh, which represents a strategic market for Turkish products, not to mention the Turkish opposition parties' unprecedented criticism of the Turkish president because of his hostility to Riyadh, And slipping behind issues related to the Saudi interior. On the other hand, the Saudi Crown Prince, in turn, seems to need to strengthen his plan for the Kingdom 2030 and enhance his country's image globally, which qualifies him to market himself internally as the new founder of the modern Kingdom, and then the relationship with the powers of the region, including Turkey, seems a priority during the next stage .

Saudi Caution

Turkish President Erdogan sent many positive messages to Riyadh, which dealt with it cautiously, and despite the former's insistence on the importance of developing relations and normalizing them completely, Riyadh seems more slow, and prefers a step-by-step policy, which means that what Turkey has provided over the past months has not succeeded in completely dispelling its political doubts. Saudi Arabia's reluctance to respond to the Turkish president's rush towards normalizing relations indicates the continued Saudi skepticism in his policies, as Saudi Arabia may be satisfied with his relative retreat from his blatant skirmishes in the Khashoggi case, and in the Yemeni and Libyan arena, and support for the Muslim Brotherhood, and armed entities in the region, but it may still be convinced that what seems to be a retreat enters the door of maneuvers, and expresses temporary bends of some storms that It blew over Turkey last period. It is likely that there are various bars that push Riyadh to adopt a cautious policy towards full openness with Ankara.

First, the course of  contacts over the past months has shown the complexity of the contentious files between the two countries, especially with regard to the continued Saudi support for the vision of Greek and Cypriot moves in the eastern Mediterranean.

Second : There seems to be Saudi bitterness from Turkish behavior, according to observers, Saudi Arabia viewed Turkey as an important Yemeni ally, but great disappointment

The kingdom felt it after Khashoggi's murder, when Turkey and Erdogan personally tried to engage in political and economic blackmail with the kingdom. Here, the Turkish president's visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2022 could not be explained by media and diplomatic momentum within Saudi political circles.

Third: Saudi Arabia  is still waiting to re-push economic relations with Turkey, as Turkish exports to the Kingdom have not reached their hoped-for level, and although Turkey's exports to Saudi Arabia jumped by 25% in the first quarter of 2022 to reach about $ 70 million during the first three months of 2022, according to data from the Turkish Exporters Association, thanks to the recent qualitative rapprochement between the two countries, the volume of Turkish exports remains small when compared to what was in 2020, as Turkey exported goods to Saudi Arabia in January 2020 only worth $221 million.)

The fourth reason is related to the continued Saudi suspicions about the Turkish military bases in Qatar, as well as Saudi concern about frequent talk since 2020 about a Turkish move to sign a security agreement with the Sultanate of Oman, allowing Ankara to establish a military base on the territory of the Sultanate .

The fifth reason behind Riyadh's caution is Turkey's insistence on supporting and sponsoring the Muslim Brotherhood, which Saudi Arabia classifies as a terrorist group, as Turkey hosts a significant number of the group's leaders, not to mention the Brotherhood's media platforms that broadcast from Istanbul.

Behind the above, Riyadh may want at the current stage to keep the door of the relationship with Ankara ajar without closing it completely, especially since Erdogan may leave power next year, given the decline in his popularity in the Turkish street, and his loss as a significant part of his traditional balance among the ranks of Turkish conservatives, due to the deterioration in the Turkish currency and the deterioration of living conditions. Saudi Arabia is also aware of the magnitude of the international pressure on Turkey, which has contributed to the decline of its regional and international immunity, and plunged it into a spiral. of tensions with international powers, especially the United States and the European Union. On the other hand, Riyadh realizes that Ankara's relations with Moscow have not risen to the level of a strategic alliance in return for a remarkable rise in the Saudi role regionally and internationally, especially after the Ukraine crisis, and the need for international powers to strengthen understandings and coordination with Saudi Arabia to compensate for the shortage in energy supplies that Moscow provided.

In the end, it can be said that despite the policy of openness between Ankara and Riyadh, which was reinforced by the Saudi crown prince's visit to Turkey as well as the closure of the Khashoggi case by the Turkish judiciary last June, Riyadh still expresses hidden doubts about the full rapprochement with Turkey, which may prevent full normalization of the relationship for the time being.