Every political system is an embodiment of the concept of legitimacy within a specific temporal and spatial context. Legitimacy is not merely a popular or constitutional recognition of authority; rather, it is a metaphysical agreement between the ruler and the ruled regarding the meaning and utility of power. This agreement stems from its ability to justify its existence and cohesion in the face of profound questions: What is the common good? What is justice? And how can authority achieve a balance between the individual and society?

In the Saudi model, the concept of "legitimacy through achievement" emerges as a central tool for sustaining power in the face of modern challenges. The early Saudi system was based on legitimacy derived from Sunni Islamic heritage, where the alliance between the Al Saud family and the Wahhabi institution represented a cohesive central identity. However, this cohesion faced major challenges due to the social and economic developments imposed by global transformations. The state thus shifted to presenting "achievement" as a measure of legitimacy, where large-scale projects such as "Neom" and Vision 2030 became symbols of the regime's ability to generate the common good in an era marked by uncertainty.

Saudi "legitimacy through achievement" is not merely a response to immediate needs but an attempt to redefine the relationship between power and society through economic and social modernization. However, this model rests on a hidden assumption: the existence of a cohesive social unity that accepts achievement as compensation for the absence of political pluralism. This unity, despite its apparent effectiveness, conceals deep tensions related to issues of identity and balanced development within a culturally and regionally diverse society.

As for Iraq, it represents a completely different philosophical case. Legitimacy here is not just an agreement about material achievements, but a reflection of the complexity of a deeply rooted social structure. Iraq is not a politically unified entity but a mosaic of sects, ethnicities, and cultures, where concepts of belonging and pluralism contend in the formation of the state's meaning. Previous regimes, especially during the era of Saddam Hussein, attempted to impose a monolithic concept of power that ignored this diversity. Legitimacy at that time was built on fear and exclusion, not on consensus and recognition.

After 2003, Iraq rediscovered pluralism as a source of legitimacy, but it was a confused pluralism, corrupted by institutional corruption and sectarian politics. Pluralism here is not merely a division of power among components but a profound philosophy that requires recognizing that the Iraqi identity is not a singular essence but a network of interconnected relationships that cannot be separated or suppressed without destroying the national self.

The comparison between the Saudi and Iraqi models reveals a struggle between two perceptions of legitimacy: one monolithic, based on material achievements to gain popular satisfaction, and the other pluralistic, relying on social consensus as a basic condition for system stability. Saudi "legitimacy through achievement," despite its success in achieving relative stability, remains hostage to the state's ability to continue producing achievements, making it vulnerable to economic or political fluctuations. On the other hand, Iraq, with its deep diversity, proves that material achievements alone are insufficient to guarantee legitimacy; rather, stability requires the construction of a new social contract based on respecting pluralism and embracing it as a creative force, not a political burden.

History offers a profound lesson in this context. During the Abbasid era, Caliph al-Ma'mun understood that the stability of the state could only be achieved through embracing pluralism. Al-Ma'mun brought Arabs, Persians, and Turks together within his state, opening avenues for cultural and scientific interaction, making Baghdad a global center for intellectual and scientific creativity. This success was not just the result of material achievements, but of a political philosophy that saw diversity as a source of strength and creativity.

If we reflect on this lesson in the context of modern Iraq, we find that national legitimacy cannot be built on imposing a singular vision of identity or power. Major projects may achieve temporary satisfaction, but they cannot address the deep wounds left by decades of exclusion and repression. True legitimacy in Iraq must be built on a philosophy that embraces pluralism as a condition for existence, not as a dilemma to be solved.

It can be said that the difference between the Saudi and Iraqi models is not just a matter of means, but a reflection of a profound philosophical divergence about the meaning of legitimacy and power. Saudi Arabia bets on the centrality of achievement as a means of unifying society, while Iraq demonstrates that pluralism, with all its contradictions, is the only way to produce sustainable legitimacy. The question arises: Can Iraq rediscover itself by managing its pluralism creatively? And can Saudi Arabia reconcile "legitimacy through achievement" with the need for political reforms that ensure broader representation? The answers to these questions will determine not only the fate of these systems but also the nature of the relationship between legitimacy and development in the Arab and Islamic world as a whole.